As highlighted in a previous analysis, funding from Arabian Gulf countries significantly contributes to the foreign financial inflows into US universities. These nations, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, demonstrate a particularly high level of donation relative to the size of their economies compared to many other countries.
Before delving into the allocation and implications of this financial input, it’s crucial to address a perspective upfront. There’s a concern that Arab money in US universities might inadvertently contribute to a reduction in critical analysis of the donor regimes while simultaneously amplifying criticism directed towards the US and Israel. The Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia, are governed by regimes that are fundamentally illiberal and exhibit considerable suppression of political, religious, and cultural dissent within their borders. Furthermore, their foreign policy agendas often diverge from, or are even antithetical to, values and interests considered desirable in the US. While acknowledging that both the US and Israel are subject to valid criticism, they generally represent forces that promote relative freedom within their societies and advocate for positive values internationally. Therefore, an overemphasis on the shortcomings of the US and Israel while overlooking the documented abuses within some Arab states represents a skewed moral compass.
While a comprehensive defense of this viewpoint warrants a more extensive discussion, for the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that prioritizing criticism of the US and Israel while minimizing scrutiny of Arab states is not a desirable outcome.
Contracts vs. Gifts: Understanding Arab Funding Streams
The majority of financial flows from Arabian Gulf states to US universities are categorized as “contracts” rather than outright “gifts.” Of the nearly $322 million originating from Gulf countries, approximately $234 million is designated as contracts. These contracts predominantly appear to finance support and research endeavors linked to Arabian Gulf oil production. For instance, a substantial $111 million of the contract sum was directed to Carnegie Mellon University from Qatar’s Supreme Council for Information and Technology. An additional $19 million was allocated to the Colorado School of Mines by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company. While these contracts may carry political implications, their primary focus seems to be centered around economic activities and collaborations in specific sectors.
This leaves a total of just over $88 million classified as gifts, distinct from contracts, originating from Arabian Gulf donors since 1995. These gifts have been distributed amongst 14 US universities, reflecting a philanthropic dimension to the financial engagement.
The Scale of Arab Gifts to US Universities
Although $88 million appears to be a considerable sum, it represents a remarkably small fraction when compared to the overall endowments of US universities. According to data from the National Association of College and University Business Officers, the 785 higher education institutions surveyed collectively held $524 billion in endowments as of fiscal year 2007. Against this backdrop, the Arabian Gulf contributions constitute a mere 0.02% of the total endowment value. Even when considering solely the 14 universities receiving these gifts, the proportion of Arab money remains a minor component of their individual endowments.
| Recipients of Arabian Gulf Gifts Since 1995 |
|---|
| American University (The) |
| Boston University |
| Columbia University |
| Cornell University |
| George Washington University |
| Georgetown University |
| Harvard University |
| Howard University |
| MIT |
| Michigan State University |
| Rice University |
| Texas A&M University |
| Tufts University |
| University of Arkansas |
| Total |
For instance, at Georgetown University, the reported gift amount represents approximately 1.5% of their endowment. At the University of Arkansas, this figure is slightly above 2% of the endowment. Across the other recipient institutions, the gift amounts consistently remain below 2% of their respective endowments, highlighting the relatively limited scale of this funding in the context of overall university financial resources.
The income generated from these gifts contributes an even smaller percentage to the annual operating budgets of these institutions. Typically, less than 5% of endowment gifts are available for annual expenditure. This implies that the $88 million in gifts would generate less than $4.4 million in spendable funds annually across all recipient universities. At George Washington University, with a fiscal year 2008 budget projecting $553 million in revenue, the nearly $12 million in Arabian Gulf gifts would yield roughly $600,000, constituting a mere 0.1% of the annual revenue stream. Similarly, at Columbia University, with a reported fiscal year 2006 revenue of almost $2.7 billion, the Arab money gifts would generate approximately $25,000, an amount practically negligible within their vast financial operations.
Is Arab Money Buying Influence? Examining Potential Impacts
While the Arabian Gulf countries stand out as disproportionately significant foreign donors to US universities, the magnitude of their gifts is dwarfed by the total endowments and annual budgets of these institutions. This raises the question: is Arab money effectively “buying” influence within these academic settings? American universities, while potentially receptive to marginal funding opportunities, are unlikely to fundamentally alter their institutional priorities based on the current scale of Arabian Gulf donations.
However, it is noteworthy that the 14 universities receiving these gifts include a notable concentration of academics who have been characterized as displaying a willingness to downplay or excuse Arab wrongdoings while exaggerating perceived missteps by the US and Israel. For those familiar with lists such as David Horowitz’s “101 most dangerous professors,” a significant proportion of individuals on such lists are affiliated with these 14 universities. This suggests a possible correlation between the flow of Arab money and the presence of certain academic viewpoints within these institutions.
It’s plausible that Arab money tends to be directed towards universities where professors already sympathetic to their worldview are present. The funding might amplify the voices of these academics and provide them with enhanced platforms, but it is less likely to fundamentally alter the pre-existing views of these individuals or the core priorities of the universities themselves.
Shifting Focus to Middle Eastern Studies
Before dismissing concerns about undue influence, it’s crucial to consider the scale of these gifts relative to the pre-existing funding landscape within specific academic niches, particularly Middle Eastern Studies. While $4.4 million in annual spendable funds might be insignificant for a large US university, it represents a substantial sum within the comparatively limited financial ecosystem of Middle Eastern Studies programs.
Within this specialized field, the prospect of attracting an $18 million gift can exert considerable influence on academic trajectories. Individuals seeking successful careers in Middle Eastern Studies might feel incentivized to adjust the focus of their research and teaching to align with perspectives favored by potential Arab money donors. Furthermore, recipients of these substantial gifts gain an amplified capacity to favor like-minded colleagues and potentially disadvantage those holding dissenting views. This dynamic can contribute to shaping the intellectual composition of Middle Eastern Studies programs and, by extension, influence institutions that draw upon graduates from these programs, such as the State Department and intelligence agencies like the CIA.
As Martin Kramer articulated, this funding environment can create a disincentive for critical analysis: “Of course, this is why we can’t ever expect to get the straight story on Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism and oil from people who operate within Middle Eastern studies. If you want a fabulously wealthy Saudi royal to drop out of the sky in his private jet and leave a few million, you had better watch what you say — which means you had better say nothing.”
Countering Potential Influence: A Call for Balanced Funding
If the primary concern is the potential for undue influence on emerging scholars and the direction of Middle Eastern Studies, a straightforward solution emerges. Those who advocate for a more critical perspective on Saudi Arabia and a balanced view regarding the US and Israel should actively contribute their own financial resources to universities. Counterbalancing the $88 million in Arab money dispersed over a decade should be well within the collective financial capacity of those who support US and Israeli perspectives and values.
Navigating the intricacies of establishing such funding mechanisms within universities can be complex. However, organizations exist to facilitate this process. The Veritas Fund for Higher Education Reform, for example, assists donors in ensuring their philanthropic intentions are effectively realized within academic institutions.
Moreover, transparency regarding the sources and destinations of foreign donations is paramount for effectively addressing potential imbalances in influence. Calls for enhanced transparency legislation, as advocated by figures like Stanley Kurtz, are crucial for ensuring informed awareness of the flow of Arab money and its potential impacts.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the issue of Arabian Gulf influence in US higher education is a tangible concern. While the overall financial scale might not fundamentally reshape entire universities, the strategic allocation of Arab money, particularly within specific fields like Middle Eastern Studies, carries the potential to shape academic discourse and subtly influence related institutions. However, this potential influence is not insurmountable. By promoting transparency and fostering a more balanced funding landscape through counter-funding initiatives, those holding differing perspectives can effectively mitigate and manage the potential impacts of Arabian Gulf financial contributions to US universities.
